Trump’s Win Could Be an Artifact of the Voting System
By John Lawrence
Statue of Jean-Charles de Borda in Dax, France
Not many people give much thought to the dynamics of the voting system. We just accept that you vote for one guy or the other and everybody gets one vote and the person who gets the most votes wins.
This system, called plurality voting or first-past-the-post, seems obvious, but there are a myriad of other kinds of voting systems. For instance, each voter could rank order all the candidates with the lowest candidate getting zero points and the next candidate above them in the rank order getting one point, the one above them getting two points etc. Then the one with the most points wins.
This system was first proposed by the French philosopher Jean-Charles de Borda in 1770. As the result of more information per voter being collected by the voting system, a different, and presumably more accurate, outcome could occur.
In the case of the Republican primary the single vote per voter with so many candidates almost guaranteed some sort of anomaly. A total of 17 candidates started off in the primary on March 23, 2015. As each state was ticked off, Trump garnered most of the votes; however, a majority of the voters voted for one of the other candidates.
The result was that Trump was reported as having “won” the state, especially if it was a winner-take-all state. As Trump won, his momentum built up and before too long, his winning the primary seemed inevitable. Even after all but Cruz and Kasich had dropped out, Cruz and Kasich were splitting the anti-Trump vote.
In After Trump, the GOP May Need a Better Voting System, Kathleen Parker writes:
… the better candidates didn’t win because, obviously, so many of [the candidates] siphoned votes from stronger ones, giving Trump the lead and all-important momentum. Thus, the constant refrain from Trump supporters that the “establishment” is ignoring the “will of the people” is true only to a point. Trump is the choice of a plurality of the GOP but not of the majority — a distinction with a crucial difference.
What If There Had Been Two Candidates – Trump and anti-Trump?
If the primary field had coalesced around one or two anti-Trump candidates and Trump earlier in the game, the outcome might have been completely different. Suppose each voter in the Republican primary had not only given his first choice candidate a vote, but had also given his second choice a vote as well. It might have been discovered that there was a solid candidate other than Trump who had a vast majority of second choice votes as well as a goodly number of first choice votes. Adding together first and second choice votes might have selected someone other than Trump as the winner of the election.
If there are more than two candidates running for election in the American way of voting, often times the third candidate acts as a spoiler splitting the vote for one of the two most popular candidates with the result that the least popular ends up the winner. Ross Perot was a third party candidate in 1992 and 1996. History seems to show that he did not siphon off enough votes from Republicans to give Bill Clinton the election. Clinton would have won anyway, Perot or no Perot. However, in the 2000 election Ralph Nader running as a third party candidate did siphon off enough votes from Democrats to give George W Bush the election. If all votes had actually been counted Gore would have won anyway, but if Nader had not been in the race, Gore would have won handily.
French Enlightenment Philosopher Condorcet, Voting Theorist
The Marquis de Condorcet was an Enlightenment philosopher who was way ahead of his time. I visited him in the Pantheon in Paris because he’s one of my heroes.
Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen write in the New York Times:
The Marquis de Condorcet, the great 18th-century political theorist and mathematician, proposed a system for electing candidates who truly command majority support. In this system, a voter has the opportunity to rank candidates. For example, her ballot might rank John Kasich, Ted Cruz and Mr. Trump in that order, meaning that she likes Mr. Kasich best, but if he doesn’t win, she would go for Mr. Cruz. She could, alternatively, choose to vote just for Mr. Kasich, which would amount to ranking Mr. Trump and Mr. Cruz in a tie for second. The winner would then be the candidate who, according to the rankings, would defeat each opponent individually in a head-to-head matchup — a real majority winner.
Approval Voting and Politonomics
In 1977, New York University politics professor Steven J. Brams and decision theorist Peter C. Fishburn devised approval voting, by which, according to their method, voters cast a vote for each candidate of whom they approve, in no particular order. The candidate with the most votes would win. Approval voting has been shown to be superior to the American method of first-past-the-post, but the problem is where do you draw the line between those candidates you approve and those you disapprove?
I devised a method for doing exactly that. I call my method politonomics because it has applications to both politics and economics, in particular to Economic Democracy, and it is capable of producing multiple outcomes instead of just “the winner of the election.” Multiple outcomes could be advantageous, for instance, in electing a city council without resorting to winner-take-all districts or a districtless Congress.
Using another voting system in which voters rank the candidates (A is preferred to B is preferred to C) or rate the candidates (on a scale from minus one to plus one, for example) provides the system with much more information than just casting a vote for the most preferred candidate.
Outcomes can then be determined in which the overall satisfaction of the electorate is more likely to be achieved. Minorities will be better represented than they will be with majority rule. None of the voting systems proposed so far is perfect.
There can be anomalous outcomes produced by all of them (except perhaps politonomics). However, the antiquarian nature of the American voting system whether in Congressional or Presidential elections and especially in gerrymandered districts could very well indeed lead us down the road to the first Fascist President.
John Lawrence
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John,
This is an extremely important subject you’ve brought up! Well done! Following are some simple, but hopefully not simplistic, thoughts.
I believe coalition multi-party governing systems in advanced EU countries – where a number of parties and their candidates achieve proportional government representation at state and local levels depending on the number of votes received – offer very fair social and economic choices. They result in an effective broad based voter and hence legislative representation to maximize public satisfaction in both the economic and political sectors.
For 35 years now, I have witnessed firsthand how a multi-party coalition political system operates, particularly in the Netherlands. I have generally found the results fair, equitable, democratic, rational in ultimately reflecting the particular tastes, needs, desires of diverse segments of the public. In short, I think the Dutch coalition system (e.g., like German, Scandinavian systems) comes close to creating social welfare and economic polices that provide “the greatest good for the greatest number.”
I think a major reason for this, among others, is that far more complete objective information (not muddled by ideological bias or distortion, media or institutional manipulation, outsider money pressures, etc.) is produced and made transparent on which to base decisions and to gain general public support. The Dutch coalition system involving 11 parties, for example, expands the different voices, opinions and interactions in the rational give-and-take of public welfare and economic discussions and formulation of decisions and policies serving the common good.
Each one of the 11 Dutch parties shares proportionately in the decision making process of making the case for their individual voter constituency’s wants and needs. A fine art of compromise and pragmatism among party representatives – despite some occasional sharp differences – is inherent in the coalition system. If Parliament and government leaders can’t agree by compromise, the government can fall including the party coalition leadership. This brings pressure on all to overcome impasses in legislative policy formulation and implementation by balanced decision-making.
I sense this 11 party proportional representation system effectively solves Marquis de Condorcet’s “paradox” that for a society to assess preferences regarding a policy or voter choice it must be able to add up individual preferences to determine accurately, rationally the preferred outcome of society as a whole. The Dutch coalition governance system does this by significantly extending the range of ideas, programs and policy alternatives for constructive compromise aimed at achieving ‘the greatest good for the greatest number.’
The America conservative right will likely robotically assail this approach as government “socialism” that undermines market forces and individual freedom. Nonsense! If true, how does one explain the economic success of many EU countries that spend 50% of their GDP on social welfare protection and redistribution without compromising business success, innovation, entrepreneurship?
In the Netherlands, the multi-party participation and representation at all governing levels is a real life situation. It truly does maximize individual and group social utility satisfaction and fairness in voting choices and social/economic policy choices. Another important factor is that Constitutions are regularly being updated here to incorporate fairer adjustments and to improve the well-being of all. I believe this action greatly minimizes sub-optimal laws, policies, resource allocations, i.e., socially and economically undesirable decisions.
The Dutch multi-party broad-based voter representation exceeds by far the U.S. “winner-takes-all” two-party system where, for example, only one person will be elected in single member districts thus leading to minorities being vastly under-represented. Making U.S. things worse is the disease of a complex, non-transparent multi-faceted “rigged” system, e.g., gerrymandering, Big Money influence on politician selection and legislation, politicians rotating into powerful roles as insider-lobbyists, voter fraud and manipulation, etc. This entrenches elite insider control of the electoral process and policy agenda and the very limited influence of the general public. As Lord Acton once said, “Power always corrupts; absolute power corrupts absolutely.”
There are “varieties” of capitalism and democracy. Unlike the advanced countries of Europe, American capitalism produces very stark inequality in the distribution of property and income. Our democracy is also much less social welfare oriented and egalitarian. We have evolved into an oligarchy divided between the top 10% ‘Haves’ and the bottom 90% ‘Have Nots’ – where the working class priorities and needs in both parties are unattended to, if not outright ignored. Our “variety” of a capitalistic economy and democratic voting decisions are not maximizing social welfare, i.e., are not producing “the greatest good for the greatest number of people.” We have the highest homeless and poverty rates of any western nation … but the most millionaires and billionaires,
In contrast, I have seen in Europe how economic and social interests for the vast majority of people are equitably integrated into public policies. Capitalism, democracy and social welfare co-exist in much better harmony to maximize the common good – without discouraging individual initiatives and, as noted earlier, while still generating successful businesses, innovation, entrepreneurship, strong educational systems, and concern for actions against the human-induced climate change threat to planet earth.
The U.S. governance system and separation of powers will never live up to democratic expectations and be in constructive co-existence with our pure capitalism “variety” until Big Money is removed. The $multi-millions spent to be elected and reelected is an insidious force, indelibly corrupting core political, economic, and social decision-making processes at local and federal levels.
The Citizens United decision granting ‘personhood’ to corporations has only magnified an obscene money-corrupted political situation and rule by the elite few for the elite few … that is inevitably making fair and rational social welfare and economic choices increasingly impossible.
These social-political choice dysfunctions are happening while we don’t have a long-term perspective; while we lurch from crisis to crisis, while we jump from war to war … guided by polarized political leaders primarily concerned about the next election rather coming together on what we should be doing today to address the likely problems hitting us in the future.
Frank, thank you for this cogent and insightful analysis. Certainly proportional representation allows for many more diverse viewpoints including minorities to be represented in any governing council as opposed to the districting system in the US that just allows the majority in each district to be represented. Since the districts in most states are not drawn rationally, which would allow minority winners in districts containing a majority of a minority, but are gerrymandered, minorities end up with no representation at all. Such is the situation in the southern states which have sizable black minorities but are governed especially at the national level almost exclusively by whites.
My system, politonomics, does essentially what proportional representation does – it allows for multiple members to be elected from any district. It would be interesting to look at how the two voting systems are similar and/or different.
John,
I should add that the Netherlands has its share of experiences with governmental obsolete structures, bureaucracy and slow Parliamentary decision-making not in step with rapid technological and social changes in these times. That’s why in recent years there ahs been a political movement towards recognizing that cities are the future where pragmatic and not overly ideologically pure mayors are better in touch with citizens and local problems.
Step-by-step, more decision-making room is being given to provinces and Dutch cities where populations are concentrated. An active central government is certainly desired by the Dutch people regarding fundamental social protection, welfare, and economic choices. But also what is wanted is a central government that is less vertical (top down) and more horizontal (in partnership) when it comes to deciding what cities can and must do.
This governing decentralization is exemplified in the international recognition received by the city Eindhoven, former home of Phillips. In 2011, the Intelligent Community Forum designated Eindhoven as the cleverest regional community in the world from many perspectives. The mayor of Eindhoven, Rob van Gijzel, is an admirer of the American political scientist Benjamin Barber, known for his best seller, “If Mayors Ruled the World – Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities.” Mr. van Gijzel is coming out with his own book soon (with a prologue by Mr. Barber) entitled, “The City That Makes the Future.” Of course getting closer to the will of the people suits the Dutch who are by nature, commercially and politically, very collaborative and open-minded.
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NOTE:
I shall get back to you soonest, John, on Dutch voting system compared to current and potential alternate American voting systems.
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Hi Frank and thank you (once again) this time for your detailed explanation of the situation in the The Netherlands. I sounds like many parties representing many points of view in a pluralistic society only makes sense.
I agree with John’s assertion that there are much better voting structures than the “majority rules” structure we have lived with for 200 yrs. But it’s all breaking down as is apparent from the huge apathy that exists here. Most people have simply lost all interest in politics. So, they just mind their own business, which is exactly what the money & power interests want them to do, of course.
Every election cycle it seems there is talk, and indeed there are a few minor party candidates on the ballot, but they never seem to go anywhere. But I have to wonder how a country like this one (the US) could ever really shift from 2 parties, one supposedly representing the more conservative elements of society and the other supposedly representing the more liberal, to >10! As it is with only 2 parties representing such a wide spectrum of viewpoints, one’s party identification mean little, especially when that affiliation is so distorted as it is by the influence of money in the political process. That is unless you believe as I do that both parties are philosophically bankrupt, long ago bought out by monied interests. And so I belong to neither party, as does perhaps as much as 1/2 the population here. Here, you get listened to only in proportion to what you give to a candidate. The rest of us are just the “masses” and as such are tolerated.
I also wonder is the homogeneity of Dutch society influences the relative success of the multi-party process in play there, and how the greater plurality of American society would affect a multi-party system here.
Paul, the homogeneity of Dutch society would lead to fewer parties one would think, and the multigeneity of US society should give rise to many more parties. It’s just that the US system of voting precludes more than 2 parties.
Um. What about these:
“Kill Dutch Jihadis so they can’t return home, says PM’s Party.” http://www.newsweek.com/better-jihadis-die-abroad-come-home-says-dutch-pm-311922
“New Dutch EU presidency vows tough line on refugees.” http://www.politico.eu/article/dutch-eu-presidency-tough-line-refugees-soft-poland-borders-council/
Rutte has made many controversial statements: https://books.google.com/books?id=Wrw8gC8vCnUC&pg=PA192&lpg=PA192&dq=mark+rutte+netherlands+controversial+statements&source=bl&ots=QhrDsFLA8Y&sig=N_wwWQhO1nCyazKIKgKIj8Hkgwg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiOj83n_YbNAhUNxGMKHfFMCSkQ6AEITDAH#v=onepage&q=mark%20rutte%20netherlands%20controversial%20statements&f=false
While I do appreciate the parliamentary system, in Germany it has meant that the Neo-Nazi parties have held some seats…. something that would never happen in the U.S.
Hi Barbara,
Regarding your links:
In the first link, Premier Rutte got into deep trouble and criticism from a number of the coalition partners and much of the public with his uncalled, brutal presidential words (quite uncharacteristic of him) proclaiming his wish that Dutch jihadis are killed in Syria before returning to the Netherlands.
In the second link, what Rutte said about severely limiting refugee flows was said when the total flow had reached over a million refugees and is now at 3000 a week with 1000 drowning in just the last few days. America’s in panic with just 10,000-15,000 potential Syrian refugees entering the country. You can imagine what with happen if a million were hitting the east coast border … all those NRA guns would be loaded up!
In the 3rd link, you’ve provided an excellent review of how and why populism has grown in the Netherlands and EU nations. The processes of EU unification, globalization and mass immigration are among the key factors giving rise to the rise of populism. But it’s even more complex than that as the article explains.
Populist groups try to present their concerns as representing the people as one. That’s not true as research noted in the 3rd link article confirms that, “The will of the people is too heterogeneous to fit the populist presentation of the people-as-one.” In my view, that stems in part, in my view, from the deep tradition of multi-party systems and related check-and-balance countervailing powers within European political institutions. I’m not saying a tyrant facist group and leader cannot ever emerge, but only that it’s highly unlike given the democratic transformations that have matured in Europe since WWII.
While historically the Netherlands has not been a stranger to internal polarization and conflict, in past decades the Netherlands has remained quintessentially a country where the tradition of consensus democracy aligned with dialogue, deliberation and cool heads ultimately rules the day. I’ve watched it closely for 35 years now, and it’s truly impressive. This means excesses of any “ISM” are restrained by the check and balance diversity of opinions/philosophies represented in the multi-party coalition political system. Excesses and stupid uncalled for remarks like Rutte made are pounced upon immediately and analyzed up and down ad into infinity.
Yes, Germany has a small radical right wing populism movement waving Nazi flags. In the past, Neo-Nazi parties have had some seats in the Parliament, but they were banned when they got out of order. Same applies now when similar groups of macho, hard-nosed Nazi-like radical hoodlums go out into the streets. Merkel takes no prisoners when it comes to Neo-Nazies behaving in a reckless manner. She, of all people, knows what totalitarianism is all about.
Best wishes,
Frank
Frank, since we’re a grassroots news outlet I would be very curious to read more about your community work and grassroots efforts to address xenophobia in the Netherlands. What opportunities are available for natives and also expats to address racism, populism, anti-Semitism, anti-Muslim sentiment, etc. in the Netherlands?
And the Electoral College? What a farce now that we must tolerate “superdelegates”? Is there a way to get rid of the Electoral College altogether and with it all of the pledged and unpledged (“super”) delegates?
John,
Following is a much abridged summary of the Dutch coalition governance and voting frameworks founded on the principle of proportional representation.(see two sources: “Dutch Elections / House of Representatives,” of representatives.nl/elections; “Dutch Politics 1 – The Rules of The Game,”
Understandably, Dutch coalition politics is complex and leap-years apart from our two-party system. But over past 35 years I’ve found the Dutch coalition governance system to be very effective and fair in meeting the heterogeneous social/economic priorities of most Dutch citizen groups represented today by 6 large parties and 5 rather small parties.
INTRODUCTION
The Netherlands is a parliamentary democracy. There are three tiers of government – the National government comprising the Cabinet and Parliament, the Provincial governments, and the Local or Municipal councils.
The Cabinet, made up of the Prime Minister, other Ministers and Secretaries, exercises executive power and is responsible for governing the nation. The Parliament scrutinizes the Cabinet and makes laws in cooperation with the Cabinet. The Parliament consists of two Chambers: the Senate (or First Chamber) has 75 members voted for by the provincial government councils; the House of Representatives (or Second Chamber) has 150 members directly voted for by the public. Local government is run by directly-elected municipal and provincial councils.
The House of Representatives has the right to approve the budget, to ask questions, to interpret, to submit motions, to institute an inquiry, the right of amendment and initiative. A passed bill by the House moves too the Senate which can either approve or reject legislation, although it rejects proposals on only rare occasions. The Senate cannot amend legislation. In practice, the Cabinet and House of Representatives react to problems in the Senate by slightly changing the proposals. In a conflict between the Cabinet and House of Representatives, the House has the final word.
COALITION & Coalition AGREEMENT
After elections, not only is there a new House of Representatives, but also a new Cabinet. In Dutch parliamentary history, no single party has ever gained the majority of 76 seats or more in the House of Representatives. Thus, parties have to cooperate to form a coalition government. Parties that are not included constitute the opposition in the House of Representatives. Usually, two large parties are required for a majority government majority and sometimes a 3rd smaller party can make up the team. Dutch voters appreciate a Left-Center-Right division.
An informateur is assigned to explore which parties are ready and able to form a new Cabinet and any obstacles that have to be overcome. He negotiates with the coalition parties about the common goals and the key policy themes of the new Cabinet. These key themes of the shared policies and goals are formulated in a draft Coalition Agreement. This is presented for comment to the political groups in the House of representatives.
The House of Representatives then appoints a Cabinet formateur who in most cases is the intended future Prime Minister (who as a rule comes from the largest party). The formateur concludes the Cabinet formation talks, divides the ministerial posts and looks for eligible people to become ministers or state secretaries on behalf of coalition parties. When completed, the Cabinet team must formally state that they agree with the Coalition Agreement. The selection process must result in a Cabinet that is supported by a workable majority in the House of Representatives.
The Coalition Agreement and a Policy Statement shedding some light on it is presented for comment to the political groups representing the coalition parties in the House of Representatives. If the political groups find too few of the goals formulated in their party’s manifests included in the Coalition Agreement, the Cabinet formation might still fall. To avoid this, the Dutch inherent qualities of pragmatic common sense and give-and-take to reach consensus resolves most differences.
THE CONFIDENCE RULE
The new Cabinet and all the Ministers must have the Parliament’s confidence. The House of Representatives can withdraw confidence, for example, by adopting a motion of “no-confidence.” If such a conflict occurs, a Minister or Cabinet will tender its resignation. This is followed by appointment of a new Minister or snap elections and the formation of a new Cabinet.
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
Since 1917, the Netherlands has had an electoral system of proportional representation. The country has no ‘winner-takes-all” electoral district system as the U.S. and U.K. have. Any person wishing to represent the people in the House of Representatives has to stand for election. People can join a political party or set up a new one on their own.
A party enters Parliament by getting enough votes – called the electoral quota – for at least one seat in Parliament. So, with 150 seats in the House of Representatives and assuming 10 million total votes, 0.0066 (1 seat divided by 150 seats) or +-66,000 votes is enough to win one seat. Each party gets the seats its total amount of votes entitles it to. The more votes a party receives, the more members the party will have in the House of Representatives. Also, parties that hold more seats in Parliament, have a greater likelihood of being included in the Cabinet’s 13 Ministries.
The system makes it possible for smaller political parties to be represented in Parliament as well. As noted, there are 11 parties in the Parliament including 6 dominant parties (VVD and PVV classical conservative and conservative populist parties; CDA and D66, centrist parties; PvdA and SP, social parties. Thus, the composition of the Dutch House of Representatives represents a broad spectrum of the different political preferences in the country.
ELECTORAL & VOTING DISTRICTS
The Netherlands – a tiny geographical country of 17 million people – is divided into 19 electoral districts that are in turn divided into polling (voting) districts. The votes cast for a specific party in the various electoral districts are added up. In each electoral district there is a principle election office. The polling stations submit their polling results to the principal electoral committee, which in turn submits the information to the Central Electoral Office in the Hague. The latter determines the overall result of the election.
As to how candidates are elected, each party hands in a list of candidates. At least 14 days before the polling day, each person eligible to vote receives a voter registration card and a list of the political parties and their candidates who are participating in the elections. These lists are also published in the newspapers.
The lists appear on the ballot in the polling district and every voter is allowed to select ONE candidate. The first person is always the party leader followed by other known to less well-known, including candidates who have excellent knowledge in a specialized field. The total number of votes for all candidates of one list determines how many seats that list gets. If a party wins 10 seats, the first 10 candidates from their party’s list are elected.
CONCLUSION
The Netherlands coalition government and voting systems seek a fair playing field and representation between majority and minority interests, i.e., to equitably maximize social and economic choices for the greatest good for the greatest number. It’s another “variety” of political and economic democracy in action.
Coalitions will likely never work in the U.S. We need first to correct the systemic corruption that pervades our electoral system in so many ways, e.g., vote district gerrymandering, super delegate manipulative process, rules eliminating up to 40% of independent voters out of primary voting, severe voter I.D. laws, the Citizen’s United Supreme Court ruling, etc.
Using your theory of politonomics, John, perhaps it is possible to come up with some form of a 3rd party breakthrough option to overcome the consummate weaknesses of our winner-takes-all two party system. From your writings and what I’ve been reading, a 3rd party in America might be feasible and appealing if there were some form of preferential voting. Preferential voting appears necessary when casting votes. It could take the form that the voter would also vote for his or her second choice.
If no candidate won a majority, the preferences of the candidate with the lowest number of votes would be distributed to the other candidates. This means a person’s vote would not be wasted in voting for the 3rd party candidate. This could ensure the elected candidate would be the choice of a majority, not just a plurality of voters – while facilitating the getting-off-the-ground success of a 3rd party.
It would also give voters more choice, granted much less than what happens in the Dutch electoral system but still a significant improvement over our current political system. Just an idea that needs lots of work! But, unfortunately, we are mind-set stuck in our corrupt and self-destructive political ways.
Frank, very interesting synopsis of the Dutch system. I have a few questions.
You say, “The lists appear on the ballot in the polling district and every voter is allowed to select ONE candidate.” So do the voters vote for individual candidates rather than parties? I thought they would vote for parties and then the parties would pick the individuals to comprise the House of Representatives depending on what proportion of the total votes each party got. It’s interesting that a party comprising one person could actually get elected providing he got the electoral quota. If he got more than that I guess he would have to come up with some other people?
Regarding the 19 electoral districts, is that just for voting convenience? Are all the votes added up over all the districts to determine the outcome or do the districts figure in some other way?
There is also a system called the Single Transferable Vote in which votes are transferred to other candidates after a particular candidate receives enough votes to be elected which may bear some resemblance to what you’re suggesting. I think in this form of proportional representation, voters vote for individual candidates rather than parties. In this system the voters decide on the individuals who will become representatives rather than the parties deciding who will get seated.
I have long felt that money plays far too important a cultural role in the US. (It seems that the “American Dream” of far too many Americans is just to make a lot of money. Am I missing the mark, or could this just be another symptom of that imbalance?
John,
Will get back to you tomorrow concerning questions on the electoral voting system in the Netherlands.
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Barbara,
Following is a short reply to your inquiry on a different subject. In general, other than Holland’s populist conservative anti-Muslim, anti EU/Euro PVV party, I don’t see that xenophobia or anti-Muslim sentiment and/or fear of ISIS terrorist actions is much different in the Netherlands than it is in most other countries in Europe.
Concerning refugees massively fleeing civil war in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and migrants fleeing (countries like Kosovo, Albania, Pakistan, Africa) for better lives in Europe, in my opinion the xenophobia and anti-immigrant waves arising in the Netherlands and the rest of Europe are being driven by two fundamental factors having little to do with racism:
(1) First, a primary underlying cause is LANGUAGE. Historically, significant immigrant inflows to the Netherlands, for example, (and other European countries, e.g., the UK) came from countries like Indonesia or India … two countries once colonized by the Netherlands many decades ago. When immigrants from such nations eventually migrated to the Netherlands, they were pretty much familiar with the Dutch language and culture. This contrasts dramatically with the current HUGE inflow of 1.6-1.8 million Mid-East refugees already in Europe since 2014 and still coming at the rate of 3,000-8,000 weekly … the vast majority of whom know NOTHING about EU languages or cultures.
(2) Second, the ENORMOUS number of Mid-East refugee asylum claims Europe (1.1 million in Germany alone) over such an incredibly SHORT time cannot be ABSORBED into the social-cultural-economic cultures without creating insurmountable social-economic pressures and breakdowns. This is the simple reality. This presents an integration struggle of a gigantic order of magnitude compared, for example, to the Turkish immigration into EU countries like Germany and the Netherlands over past decades. This immigrant influx was manageable as it was spread out and absorbed over many years.
Time permitting, I’ll expand on this most serious mass immigration movement in European history … originally fermented and nurtured by the U.S. regime change invasion of Iraq.
Given the statistics Frank cites, if no other reason than to alleviate the pressure on Europe, why is the U.S. not allowing more Syrian refugees than the paltry number that have been permitted to enter?
It does seem like the US is not stepping up to the plate and doing its fair share. It probably has to do with politics in that, if Obama and/or Hillary was out there saying we should take in more refugees, it would give Trump and the Republicans all kinds of ammunition for attacking the Democrats.
John,
I will try to be clearer about how the Dutch proportional representation government system works – designated by some to be the finest such system in the world.
SYNOPSIS: THE DUTCH BICAMERAL PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM
In 1917, proportional representation in BOTH legislative Chambers – the House of Representatives and the Senate – was introduced nationwide. A multi-party system had already begun to develop in the Netherlands during the late 19th century. Since then, no single party has ever held an absolute majority in the House. The vote percentage for the biggest party is usually around 30%, in rare instances 35%. Thus, Dutch governments are always coalition party formations of two or more parties. The distribution of seats in both Chambers reflects the diverse political trends in Dutch society.
The 150 House of representative members are directly elected for four years; the 75 Senate members are elected indirectly by chosen by the provincial councillors (who are themselves chosen in direct elections) also for four years. The elderly Senate statesmen – removed from the hype of daily political and media hype – reconsider legislation but may not amend legislation passed by the House which has the greater legislative power (quite different from U.S. government model). If a member of the House no longer agrees with his or her party, the member can stay in the House as an independent member or as connected to another parliamentary party.
NATIONAL ELECTORAL PROCESS
The House of Representatives is elected in an open party LIST system of proportional representation. House seats are distributed nationwide among different candidate lists or groups of lists that have obtained at least 0.67% of the nationwide vote. Each party is awarded as many seats as the number of times the votes for its candidates is the multiple of an established national electoral quota – the total number of valid votes in the country divided by the number of seats (150) to be filled.
Based on reports, the following will describe in more detail the complex (to the outsider) party-list voting system with proportional representation and a real life example of same for a typical municipality.
After seats are assigned to parties depending on their aggregated list votes from all the electoral 19 districts (where actual voting takes place on the basis of municipalities), people (list candidates) are then assigned to seats.
In each of the 19 districts, a party can in theory place different candidates on each of the 19 different lists. But it is common practice that the candidate ranked first on a party’s list, the party leader, is the same person throughout the country. It is also common practice that the same lists of candidates are used by parties in every district. Or another variation is that only the last five candidates are varied per district. These candidates are often well-known local politicians whom parties hope to attract extra votes with. But, chances are low these local candidates are elected due to their low position on the list.
The first step in the seat assignment process is calculating how many seats each of the different lists of a party gets by adding up the number of votes of the different lists together. If the party uses the same list in more than one electoral district, these lists are seen as one list. Seat assignment to the different lists is done by using the ‘largest remainder method.’
The second step is calculating which candidate received on his or her own more votes than 25% of the electoral quota. This is dome by adding up all the votes for a particular candidate on the different lists. These candidates are declared independent of the list order. So they get one of the seats of the list where they received the most votes. If more candidates are elected on a list than the list received seats, the candidate with the lowest number of votes is transferred to the list where he had his second best result.
As a third step, the remaining seats (if there are any) are assigned to the remaining candidates, based on their order on the list. When candidates are elected on more than one list in this way, the candidate gets the seat on the list where he or she received the most votes. This is continued until every seat is assigned. If one of these elected candidates later decides to leave parliament, then his or her seat is assigned to the next person on the list of the district the candidate leaving represents.
EXAMPLE OF ELECTORAL VOTING SYSTEM IN PRACTICE
The following voting process example is from the municipality of Oude IJsselstreek in 2010. As the total number of votes for all parties in the municipality was 17,852 votes and the municipality had 27 seats, the electoral quota for one seat was 661 votes (17,852 divided by 27 seats).
The CDA centrist party received 4,440 votes or 24.9% of total 17,852 votes as shown below. This means the CDA was entitled to seven seats In the House of representatives (4,440 votes divided by the electoral quota of 661 seats).
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1. van de Wardt, P./………….2,061 Votes
2. Aalbers-van Ham, A.A.F.J./……224
3. Steentjes, B.W.J.M./…………451
4. Berge, R.J.W.M./…………….245
5. Tekinerdogan, M./……………417
6. Ermers-Mulder, A.G.M./………..66
7. Hettinga, M.A.J./…………….99
8. Toussaint, C.P./……………..29
9. van Bergen, J.H./…………….37
10. Berenschot, H.J./…………….77
11. Hendriksen-Loverink, S./……..150
12. Buchner, A.C.A./……………..31
13. Sorgedrager-Carreira, M.P/…….22
14. Hakvoort, G.W.M./……………219
15-22 Other Candidates,/…………312
Total Votes…………………..4,440 Votes
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First, it had to be checked who of the 22 CDA candidates had more than 25% of the electoral quota of 661 seats (661 times 25% = 165 votes). This was true for candidates 1, 3,5,4,2 and 14 (in this order). Those six CDA people were elected.
Second, the one remaining CDA seat was given to the person first on the list. Since candidates 1-5 already had already qualified for seats, this last seat went to number 6 of the list.
This voting process for seat representation applied to all other party lists for elections in the municipality of Oude IJsselstreek.
This nationwide proportional representation system within a multi-party coalition system comprising 11 parties is constantly being refined. It is democratic and effective in fairly representing and reflecting the diverse needs of Dutch citizens. Problems are faced directly and corrected.
In each municipality there are multiple voting stations. Voters in each municipality receive in advance the candidates lists for all the parties. They walk into the voting booth and mostly with a red pencil mark the one party candidate they prefer.
Hope this helps somewhat to clarify voting process here better, John. There are other special technicalities I’ve ignored in this overview.
Thanks, Frank, for this clarification. So each voter votes for one and only one candidate in the House of Representatives. Is that correct? And each candidate is associated with a party. Correct? So it is easy to calculate how many votes each party gets, and then seats are assigned to that party and those individuals based on the number of votes received. Very interesting! So the voters vote for individuals and not parties with the result being that each party gets so many votes. This is a few degrees more sophisticated than just voting for a party and the party deciding which individuals to assign seats to.
If my above analysis is not correct, please let me know.
John,
Yes, you’ve re-expressed the voting quite on the mark!
John,
The voter votes for one candidate on the multi-party list who represents his or her party or votes for one candidate on the list who represents his or her preference in another party.
The important thing as I see it is that essentially the whole country is one district and the voter can vote for a candidate anywhere in the country geographically whereas in the US you can only vote for one candidate in a relatively small geographical district who represents that district and not the whole country. All these different districts are in competition with each other especially for Federal money. No one is representing the country as a whole. It seems like each representative in the Netherlands is representing the country as a whole albeit limited by the interests of his or her party.
Yes, but also take note of just a few of the points I have highlighted on how the governance system works – e.g., the much stronger legislative power of the House of Representatives directly chosen by the people by eleven parties vs. that of the Senate members who are indirectly chosen by the people via provincial councilors.
This, in addition to proportional representation under the Dutch multi-party coalition system, provides added insurance that democratic decision-making processes and social-economic policy choices remain closer to the people to protect common interests.
The Dutch are trying to improve this approach by allowing provinces and especially cities more room to make decisions locally with less interference by the national government. This is impressive for a country 13 times the population and half the size of my home state of Maine with 1.3 million people.
Frank, the only way I can see to improve on the Dutch system (I’m just talking about the House of Representatives now) would be to allow voters to rank or rate candidates so that voters would be able to express preferences for more than one candidate. For instance, a voter might strongly prefer 3 candidates, and, if the system took these second and third choices into account, the system might generate more satisfaction than it does now.
John,
No John, with respect, I disagree. I think for Holland that is going unnecessarily too far academically with the utility satisfaction theories of John Stuart Mill. The system in the Netherlands is already giving a vast, acceptable participation by the people in influencing social and economic policies. Ranking and rating theories are in effect actually alive and working well in the Dutch proportional multi-party coalition system.
As noted, the Dutch introduced proportional representation in 1917 and multi-parties coalitions in the late 19th century. They have been refining the systems for 100 years now and continue to so by making ‘pragmatic’ simple ongoing changes for the better … all in the spirit of Holland’s significant contribution to a relatively tolerant, open, multicultural society during the time of the Dutch led colony Manhattan 1603 until 1664.
John,
John,
The 2 or 3 choice per candidate you mention is effectively covered in the Dutch system in that the high number of voters who can choose his or her own ONE candidate from a list of 10-30 candidates from his or her party, or can choose ONE of ten other parties and ONE of its 10-30 candidates. This diverse choice selection is illustrated in my example of the 4.440 CDA voters for just one party in one municipality. When you multiply all the many, many municipalities together under the Dutch system, the 2 or 3 candidate choice dynamic effectively comes alive in the final aggregated result for a district and the nation as a whole.
Frank, I think the Dutch system is great. I’m just playing around with an idea here. What if every voter instead of voting for ONE could vote for TWO, approval voting style. I don’t know if you’re familiar with approval voting but essentially it would mean in this simple example that each voter would check 2 boxes – his first choice and his second choice and they would each get one vote. It might change the results slightly if enough people agreed on their second choice candidate. That candidate then might get enough first AND second place votes to have more than the 25% electoral quota. Just sayin.
I like the Dutch system a lot and I’m not being critical. A system based on politonomics might use the Dutch system with a slight modification that would allow the voter to express preferences for more than one candidate.
John,
For what it’s worth, I’d like to close out on our exchange on the Netherlands’ multi-party proportional representation and electoral systems by showing some final results. TABLE 1 shows House of Representative actual election results of 150 members in 2012 compared to expected results (i.e., covering all municipalities within 19 electoral districts) in upcoming House elections.
TABLE 1: SUMMARY – SEPTEMBER 2012 ACTUAL and MAY 2016 EXPECTED DUTCH HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION RESULTS
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………………………………ACTUAL…………EXPECTED
…………………………….2012 SEATS….%….2016 SEATS….%
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VVD-Party for Freedom……………..41…….27%…….24…….15% & Democracy
PvdA-Labor Party………………….38…….25%……..8……..5%
PVV-Freedom Party…………………15…….10%…….37…….25%
SP-Socialist Party………………..15…….10%…….15…….10%
CDA-Christian Democratic ………….13……..9%…….18…….12% Appeal Party
D66-Democrats 66………………….12……..8%…….13……..9%
CU-Christian Union…………………5……..3%……..6……..4%
GL-GreenLeft Party…………………4……..2%…….16…….11%
SGP-Reformed Political……………..3……..2%……..3……..2% Party
PvdD-Reformed Party………………..2……..2%……..4……..3% for Animals
50 Plus Party……………………..2……..2%……..5……..3%
Other Parties……………………..0……..0%……..1……..1%
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TOTAL…………………………..150……100%……150……100%
NOTE: The Netherlands has 17 million people represented by 150 seats in the House of Representatives, or an average of 113,000 people per seat. This compares to a U.S. population of 325 million people represented by 435 seats, or 740,000 people per seat.
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You can see that if the populist radical left PVV party (anti-EU, anti-immigration but pro-social programs) were elected today, it would be expected to gain 22 seats and the GreenLeft party to gain 12 seats on their showings in the 2012 elections. In contrast, the VVD conservative party and PvdA labor party would be expected to lose 17 seats and 30 seats, respectively, huge losses from their 2012 showings.
This data dramatically illustrates how every four years the DUTCH multi-party proportional representation elections nationwide give the voter not only extensive choices for his or her party candidate but also the opportunity to switch votes to another candidate listed on one of the other 11 parties.
And voters do switch if they are really unhappy with the performance of their parties. This dynamic can also result in the fall of a government during its 4-year term or force an entirely new Cabinet formation and House of Representatives formation at the end of a four year election term. The same multi-party proportional representation election process and switching possibility applies to voter indirect choices of 75 Senate seats.
Briefly, the Dutch systemic broad-based representation and political checks and balances from bottom-up are exceptional.
Frank, thanks for this discussion of the Dutch electoral system. I’ve learned a lot!